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INTRODUCTION: THE LAST WORD? THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
Charlie Savage*
It is not often in a republic more than 200 years old that a seemingly new consti-
tutional topic emerges that proves worthy of widespread academic thought. Yet on
February 3, 2007, legal and political scholars from around the nation converged on
Williamsburg, Virginia, to participate in an unprecedented conference at the William
& Mary School of Law: "The Last Word? The Constitutional Implications of
Presidential Signing Statements." Never before had an entire academic symposium
been devoted to this subject. Indeed, the time was not far gone when most Americans
had never heard of a "signing statement." But 2006 had witnessed an extraordinary
national conversation about this tool of executive power, its exponential growth in
the hands of recent Presidents, and its implications for the future of the Constitution's
system of checks and balances. This exploding attention to a previously obscure
device reached a peak at the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal's annual
scholarly symposium.
By then, the "signing statement" had become a household term, and its basic
outlines were generally understood. In short, a signing statement is an official legal
document issued by the President on the day he or she signs a bill. Filed in the
Federal Register, signing statements lay out the President's interpretation of new
laws and instruct the executive branch to interpret the laws in the same fashion. The
device becomes controversial when Presidents use it to declare that various sections
of the bills that they have just signed are unconstitutional and so do not need to be
enforced as Congress wrote them. Moreover, the laws targeted in this fashion have
most often been constraints on the President's own power as head of the executive
branch or Commander in Chief, so this claimed power to-sign-but-not-enforce boils
down to a claimed power to-sign-but-disobey. Or, as the practice's defenders prefer
to say, it is a power to instruct the executive branch to "construe" such a law in a
manner that would avoid the constitutional conflict that the President claims would
otherwise exist-such as by reinterpreting a mandatory provision into a merely
advisory one, or otherwise to discover in the statute an unwritten exception for the
President to exercise at his own discretion.
* Charlie Savage, the national legal affairs correspondent for The Boston Globe, received
the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting for his articles about the Bush administration's
signing statements and other efforts to expand presidential power. His book Takeover: The
Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion ofAmerican Democracy was published
in September 2007 by Little, Brown & Co.
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Presidents have issued signing statements challenging laws dating back to the
nineteenth century. But the practice was rare until the Reagan administration's second
term, when attorneys in the Meese Justice Department proposed issuing them more
often as a way to expand presidential power over the law.' Since the mid-1980s,
Presidents of both parties have used signing statements to challenge provisions in bills
much more frequently. And under the Bush-Cheney administration, the practice
reached an unprecedented level of intensity. By the time of this symposium, according
to data compiled by conference participant Dr. Christopher Kelley of the Miami
University in Ohio, Bush had used signing statements to target more than 1,100
distinct sections of bills-nearly double the roughly 600 such laws challenged by
all previous Presidents in American history combined.2 Moreover, unlike his
immediate predecessors, Bush had also virtually abandoned his veto power, signing
every bill that reached his desk during his first term even as he used signing
statements to eviscerate them.3
Observers outside the executive branch were slow to recognize what was happen-
ing. With the notable exceptions of Kelley and Professor Phillip Cooper at Portland
State University's Mark 0. Hatfield School of Government, most political and legal
scholars gave virtually no thought to signing statements prior to 2006.' Nor did the
media or Congress pay any attention to the signing statements the White House had
quietly filed during the first five years of the Bush-Cheney presidency. But that neglect
came to an abrupt end in January 2006 after Bush issued a signing statement assert-
ing that the President, as Commander in Chief, could set aside the so-called McCain
Torture Ban,5 a putatively loopholes-free ban on cruel, inhumane, and degrading treat-
ment by interrogators questioning detainees in the war on terrorism.6 Because Congress
had passed the new law by veto-proof majorities in the face of White House opposition
and because almost no legal scholar who did not work for the administration thought
that the President's power could trump the law, this signing statement drew widespread
attention. The topic flared up again about ten weeks later, in March 2006, when Bush
issued another provocative signing statement claiming a constitutional right to defy new
oversight provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act reauthorization billT-provisions that
he had agreed to accept in a deal to end a Senate filibuster against the bill.8 The follow-
' See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND
THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 231-32 (2007).
2 See id. at 230.
3 See id. at 230-31.
Id. at 231 n.5.
5 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,
42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 23 (Jan. 6, 2006).
6 S. Amdt. 1977, 109th Cong. (2005).
7 Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 425-26 (Mar. 9, 2006).
' See SAVAGE, supra note 1, at 228-29.
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ing month, the Boston Globe published an article reporting that Bush had by that
point used signing statements to challenge more than 750 distinct sections of bills since
taking office and detailing many of the specific laws that he had claimed a right to
disobey.9 Among them were numerous rules and regulations for the military, includ-
ing a troop cap and a ban on direct combat by U.S. forces stationed in Colombia,' °
whistleblower protections for executive branch employees," protections against polit-
ical interference in federally funded research,' 2 affirmative action hiring requirements
for the government, 3 and many other such limits or requirements Congress had placed
on the executive branch. By May, this relatively novel constitutional topic had be-
come the subject of widespread national attention. More than 150 editorial boards,
columnists, and editorial cartoonists called for an end to signing statements, and the
issue was a staple of discussion on talk radio and the political blogosphere."
The growing attention to signing statements prompted a sustained reaction in
Congress. The Senate Judiciary Committee held an oversight hearing on signing state-
ments, 1 5 and its chairman, Republican Senator Arlen Specter, filed a bill that attempted
to instruct courts not to cite a signing statement as authority for interpreting a disputed
statute and that attempted to confer upon Congress standing to sue the President over
the legal claims he made in a signing statement so that a court could review them. 16
Specter's bill did not receive a vote before the 109th Congress came to an end, but he
went on to file a revised version in 2007.17 The new version scaled back the lawsuit
section that had proved legally controversial because American courts do not issue
advisory opinions.' 8 Other bills targeting the device were also filed in the House of
Representatives,' 9 and in January 2007, the House Judiciary Committee devoted its
first oversight hearing under Democratic leadership to the topic of Bush's signing state-
9 See id. at 230-31, 371 n.26.
, Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 40
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 3012 (Dec. 23, 2004).
" Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1267 (Aug. 8, 2005).
2 Statement on Signing the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006,41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1920 (Dec. 30, 2005).
13 Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2993 (Dec. 17, 2004).
" SAVAGE, supra note 1, at 245.
15 Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong.
(2006).
16 Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006).
" Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2007, S. 1747, 110th Cong. (2007).
18 S. 1747, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007).
'9 E.g., Congressional Lawmaking Authority Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 264, 110th
Cong. (2007); Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2007, H.R. 3045, 110th Cong. (2007).
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ments.2° Democrats in 2007 also asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
to perform a study of whether Bush's signing statements were mere bluster or whether
they were being carried out.2' In June 2007, four months after the William & Mary
symposium, the GAO released its initial findings. 22 It had studied a small sample of the
provisions Bush had challenged in appropriations bills in 2005, looking at what
happened to nineteen of the challenged bill sections.23 The congressional watchdog
agency found that executive agencies had gone on to disobey six of the bill sections
that Bush's signing statements had targeted, while enforcing ten others as written.24
Three other sections did not need to be enforced because the circumstances they con-
templated had not arisen.25 This GAO report presented the first evidence that the sign-
ing statements seemed to be having a real-world impact. However, the GAO did not
study any of the most controversial challenges, such as the torture ban or the Patriot
Act oversight requirements, in part because they involved classified matters.26
Three months after the GAO report, the U.S. district court for the District of
Columbia handed down a ruling in a case that presented further evidence that signing
statements were having a real-world impact and, increasingly, becoming a source of
authority for courts.27 In 2002, Congress had passed a bill that contained a provision
requiring the State Department, when issuing passports to U.S. citizens, to list "Israel"
as the country of birth for anyone who had been born in Jerusalem.28 Bush signed
the bill into law but issued a signing statement instructing the State Department to
view the new Jerusalem-is-Israel statute as an unconstitutional intrusion into his own
"authority to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs and to supervise the unitary execu-
tive branch. '29 A few weeks later, in October 2002, a child was born to an American
couple in Jerusalem. They applied for a U.S. passport on behalf of their son, and the
State Department listed the boy's place of birth as "Jerusalem" instead of "Israel" on
that passport. The couple sued to get the State Department to obey the new law con-
cerning Jerusalem and passports, setting up a rare case in which a court had juris-
20 Presidential Signing Statements under the Bush Administration: Hearing Before H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/
appro/308603.pdf.
21 See SAVAGE, supra note 1, at 242.
22 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS ACCOM-
PANYING THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATION ACTS (2007).
23 Id. at 1.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 14.
27 Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, No. 03-1921 (GK), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68849 (D.D.C.
Sept. 19, 2007).
28 Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116
Stat. 1350 (2002).
29 Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1659 (Sept. 30, 2003).
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diction to hear a challenge to a legal claim arising from a presidential signing
statement. But on September 19, 2007, the judge dismissed the case in a decision
that both quoted Bush's signing statement and ruled that the issue was a
"non-justiciable political question."3° The White House had won.
The topic of signing statements also galvanized the legal community. Back in
2006, the American Bar Association (ABA) convened a bipartisan, blue-ribbon task
force of prominent legal scholars, former government officials, and retired judges to
study the growth of presidential signing statements.3 The task force concluded that
the device was evolving into a kind of back-door, override-proof, line-item veto power
for Presidents, one that the Founders never intended Presidents to have.32 Moreover,
it noted that because most laws restricting presidential power are not the sort that
courts are likely to have an opportunity to review, the mechanism was ripe for abuse
by any President willing to concoct, in bad faith or delusion, a false constitutional
objection to a law.33 As a prescription for closing this loophole, the task force argued
that the Constitution gives Presidents only two options: sign a bill and enforce all of
it as written, or veto a bill and give Congress a chance to override that veto.34 Based
on the task force's findings, the ABA House of Delegates voted to call on Presidents
to stop issuing signing statements, denouncing the mechanism as "contrary to the rule
of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers. 3a
Reactions to the ABA's formalist analysis varied sharply. Many lay observers,
including newspaper editorial boards and columnists, applauded and endorsed the
report. But within the academic community, the ABA's approach proved more con-
troversial, even among some who were critics of the Bush-Cheney administration's
use of signing statements. The ABA's critics argued that there is nothing inherently
wrong with a President signing a bill while simultaneously instructing the executive
branch not to enforce some of the statutes created by that bill because they are un-
constitutional.36 They noted that most people agree that the President has a duty not
to enforce an unconstitutional statute that is already on the books when he takes office,
and so, they asked, why cannot the President decline to enforce an unconstitutional
provision in a bill that he signed himself?.37 Moreover, some critics argued that be-
cause Congress has a habit of passing enormous omnibus bills lumping together many
different future laws, it is impractical for the President to veto every bill that has some
30 Zivotofsky, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68849, at *2.
31 AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abafinal-signingstatements recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.
32 See id. at 22-23.
13 See id. at 25.
34 Id. at 22.
35 Id. at 1.
36 See SAVAGE, supra note 1, at 245-47.
37 See id. at 246.
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minor constitutional flaw-such as a legislative veto provision, which Congress has
kept adding to bills in defiance of the Supreme Court's 1983 ruling that they are
unconstitutional.38 Thus, in the real world, they said, Presidents are likely to sign most
bills anyway with the intent not to enforce unconstitutional provisions, so getting rid
of signing statements would just mean that the public and Congress would not know
what was happening inside the executive branch.39
The ABA task force rejected these arguments against its report. First, it argued
that signing a bill is different from dealing with a pre-existing statute: because the
President swears an oath to defend the Constitution, he has a special duty to veto a
bill in order to prevent a statute he thinks is unconstitutional from becoming law.'
Moreover, it said, the gears of government would not grind to a halt if its prescription
were followed. Congress can quickly fix problems in a vetoed bill and pass it again,
and if Presidents started enforcing the rules more rigidly, lawmakers would likely
clean up their acts and take greater efforts to pass clean bills. And because the task
force proposed a world in which Presidents had no choice but to enforce everything
in a bill they signed, the issue of whether signing statements improve government
transparency fell away.
The critics of the ABA task force further fell into two camps. Some-almost
exclusively current and former members of the executive branch during Republican
administrations-argued that the entire hullabaloo about signing statements in 2006
was misplaced. Not only were signing statements a constitutionally valid and useful
tool in general, they argued, but nothing the Bush-Cheney administration had done
with them was in any way untoward. These critics tended to deny that the unprece-
dented number of challenges the administration had made with them-or Bush's
simultaneous disuse of the veto power-had any significance. They also tended to
defend the aggressive legal claims made by the Bush-Cheney White House by arguing
that the Clinton White House had made similar claims during the 1990s.
The other set of vocal critics of the ABA task force vehemently opposed this
view. This camp-almost exclusively former members of the executive branch under
the Clinton administration, with the exception of prominent Harvard Law professor
Laurence Tribe, who has never worked in the executive branch-agreed with the ABA
that a major constitutional problem had emerged but disagreed about the nature of
the problem.4' The problem, they argued, was not signing statements per se; they
said signing statements are both constitutional and useful so long as a President uses
them only to invoke a mainstream interpretation of the Constitution. Instead, they
said, the problem was the aggressive and widely contested constitutional theory about
executive power that the Bush-Cheney administration was invoking in its signing
3 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also SAVAGE, supra note 1, at 246.
39 SAVAGE, supra note 1, at 246.
40 Id. at 246-47.
"' See id. at 247.
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statements. a2 They accused the ABA task force of having distorted the issue in order
to avoid singling out the Bush-Cheney administration in the interest of bipartisan
appearances. This camp heatedly rejected the contention that Clinton's signing state-
ment claims resembled Bush's beyond superficial similarities, noting that Clinton
never invoked the so-called unitary executive theory as Bush had done dozens of
times and that none of Clinton's challenges were remotely as aggressive as Bush's
attacks on the torture ban or Patriot Act oversight provisions. Bush, they said, had
abused an otherwise good mechanism.
These were the arguments that spilled over into the William & Mary Bill of Rights
Journal symposium in February 2007. Representatives from all the camps attended,
as well as scholars who were interested in other topics related to the device-among
them, its historical origins, its use as a form of "legislative history" for judges to use
when interpreting ambiguous statutes, and its potential impact on administrative law.
In the following pages, many of the scholars have followed up on their presentations
and arguments with essays that flesh out their views and respond to the critiques of
others.43 Among them:
Phillip Cooper, of the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University,
argues that signing statements enable the President to act as a judge, essentially laying
down a declaratory judgment about how to interpret a law. 4 One of the few academics
who studied Bush's signing statements prior to 2006, Cooper says signing statements
should be viewed with suspicion because they potentially violate the separation of
powers system. a
Saikrishna Prakash of the University of San Diego School of Law joins in finding
signing statements alarming and goes on to embrace many of the ABA task force's
conclusions. 46 He argues that Presidents must return to vetoing any bill that they be-
lieve is unconstitutional as was understood to be a duty by the earliest Presidents. 7
Similarly, Michael Rappaport of the University of San Diego School of Law argues
that while Presidents may have the power not to enforce or obey putatively uncon-
stitutional laws that were on the books before they took office, they do not have the
discretion to sign bills with the intent of not enforcing them as written.48
42 Id.
4' The writer of this introduction did not read the essays himself. Rather, the quick synopsis
of each was derived from informal executive summaries provided to the writer by the staff of
the journal.
Phillip Cooper, Signing Statements as Declaratory Judgments: The President as Judge,
16 WM. & MARY BIL RTS. J. 253 (2007).
45 id.
46 Saikrishna B. Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 81 (2007).
47 id.
41 Michael Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of "Signing and Not Enforcing," 16 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 113 (2007).
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But Nelson Lund of the George Mason University School of Law attacks the
ABA' s conclusions.49 He argues that there is nothing wrong with the President sign-
ing a bill that he believes to be unconstitutional and that the President has just as
much right and duty to interpret the Constitution for himself as the other branches.5 °
Louis Fisher of the Library of Congress argues that most signing statements are
just bluster on the part of executive branch attorneys but that the laws are likely to
be enforced or obeyed as written anyway.5' A greater threat, he says, comes from
Presidents acting in secrecy, so signing statements are welcome because they provide
advance warning about potentially suspect presidential action in the execution of laws.52
Writing jointly, Ronald Cass, the Dean Emeritus of Boston University School of
Law, and Peter Strauss of Columbia Law School, place in a single paper the debate
between the two camps that criticized the ABA's conclusions.53 Both agree that sign-
ing statements are constitutional except when they directly undercut the legislative
purpose for enacting a law, but they disagree over where to draw that line and the view
of executive power that may be legitimately advanced in a signing statement.54
Peter Shane of Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law focuses on the
Bush-Cheney administration's unprecedented escalation of the number of challenges
made in signing statements.55 He argues that the intensified practice is best under-
stood as a desire to create a paper trail of documents which can be cited as ad hoc
precedents for its aggressive view of executive power, legitimizing such concepts
as the unitary executive theory by showing that it has long been invoked in official
government documents.56
Philip Heymann of Harvard Law School focuses on the legal claims advanced by
the Bush administration in its signing statements.57 Heymann argues that Presidents
cannot override legislative checks and balances even in a time of war, and so Congress
and the courts must hold the President accountable when he tries to seize power
contrary to legislative intent.5"
" Nelson Lund, Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 95 (2007).
50 id.
5' Louis Fisher, Signing Statements: Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 183 (2007).
52 Id.
" Ronald Cass & Peter Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy, 16 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 11 (2007).
54 Id.
55 Peter Shane, Presidential Signing Statements and the Rule of Law as an " Unstructured
Institution," 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 231 (2007).
56 Id.
51 Philip Heymann, The On/Off Switch, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55 (2007).
58 Id.
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Neal Devins of the College of William & Mary School of Law explores the
political context for Bush's signing statements as a means of exercising control over
administration decisionmaking.59 He argues that Bush's expansive use of the mech-
anism is especially remarkable given that it took place when Republicans controlled
both the White House and Congress.6°
A. Christopher Bryant of the University of Cincinnati College of Law attacks
one of the proposed remedies for the problem of signing statements-found in both
Senator Arlen Specter's 2006 bill and the ABA report--of trying to get courts to test
the validity of the legal claims made in a signing statement.6' He argues that a better
solution is for Congress to perform more aggressive oversight of how its laws are
being enforced and obeyed by the executive.62
Similarly, Michele Gilman of the University of Baltimore School of Law shares
Bryant's skepticism about litigation over the claims made in signing statements for
several reasons.63 She, too, argues that Congress must use political instead of judicial
means to carry out its will.64
Harold Krent of Chicago-Kent College of Law also criticizes the idea of grant-
ing standing to lawmakers to sue the President over claims made in a signing state-
ment.6 As an alternative remedy, he suggests a law that would enable private parties
to exact attorney's fees from the government if they successfully bring lawsuits against
the government for its failure to enforce a law that had been targeted by a presidential
signing statement.'
Christopher Kelley of Miami University in Ohio explores the historical
underpinnings of the dramatic increase in the issuance of signing statements midway
through the Reagan administration.67 Kelley, who has made a unique contribution
to the study of signing statements by compiling data about the number of challenges
issued by each President in U.S. history, argues here that the Reagan team had as its
goal from the beginning to use signing statements to increase its control of how
bureaucratic agencies interpret and implement laws.68
" Neal Devins, Signing Statements andDivided Government, 16 WM. &MARY BILLRTS.
J. 63 (2007).
60 id.
61 A. Christopher Bryant, Presidential Signing Statements and Congressional Oversight,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 169 (2007).
62 Id.
63 Michele Gilman, Litigating Presidential Signing Statements, 16 WM. & MARY BL
RTS. J. 131 (2007).
64 id.
65 Harold Krent, Fee Shifting as a Congressional Response to Adventurous Presidential
Signing Statements, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 211 (2007).
66 id.
67 Christopher S. Kelley, A Matter of Direction: The Reagan Administration, the Signing
Statement, and the 1986 Westlaw Decision, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 283 (2007).
68 Id.
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M. Elizabeth Magill of the University of Virginia School of Law also focuses on
the signing statement as a means for exerting greater political control over executive
agencies.69 She argues that the device is a forceful way for the President to have the
"first word" on agenda setting and enforcement strategies.7 °
Finally, Neil Kinkopf of Georgia State Law School, a veteran of the Clinton
administration's Office of Legal Counsel, argues that whatever their role internal to
the executive branch, signing statements should not be cited by courts as a legitimate
source of "legislative history" when interpreting the meaning of a statute.71 Kinkopf
writes that signing statements are too vaguely written to raise serious constitutional
questions in a meaningful way, have often advanced legal theories that are contra-
dictory or unsubstantiated, and frequently have been used to revise a law rather than
to offer a plausible interpretation.72
In the pages that follow, these essays demonstrate that the constitutional debate
over presidential signing statements, so brightly illuminated at the 2007 William &
Mary Bill of Rights Journal symposium, is far from over.
69 M. Elizabeth Magill, The First Word, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 27 (2007).
70 Id.
7' Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and Statutory Interpretation in the Bush Administration,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 307 (2007).
72 Id.
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